2007 Biothreat Nonproliferation Conference
We held a Biological Threat Non-Proliferation (BioNP) Conference in New Mexico in December 2007. The conference brought together experts and representatives from biomedical research, the biothreat reduction community, and relevant governmental agencies to discuss the current status of biothreat non-proliferation and science and technology development necessary to support an integrated approach to non-proliferation.
The conference was attended by about 90 participants from governmental institutions (such as the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Department of State, etc.), universities (University of New Mexico, New Mexico Tech, New Mexico State University, Vanderbilt University, etc.), and national laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories). In attendance were also representatives of Porton Down in the U.K., and the Israel Center of Disease Control. There were panel discussions on such issues as Cross-walk of WMD Nonproliferation, Public Health and Biothreat Nonproliferation, Global Biosurveillance, Biosecurity and Information Transparency vs. Restriction, etc.
The key conclusions of the conference were as follows:
- Biological threat nonproliferation is a significant challenge, but must be pursued for effective threat reduction
- Now is the time to rethink the challenges and look for sustainable multi-purpose solutions to address the growing infectious disease threat
- Global public health, medical, agricultural, and environmental challenges provide unique leveraging points for BioNP
- Global bio-surveillance is one of the most important components for BioNP, but requires: collaboration and information sharing at all levels, including between non-traditional partners; on-going background characterization studies; signature development; technology development and perhaps more importantly integration; establishing values in the areas of unusual disease outbreak investigations, vaccine design and early warning/response
- Host nations must see value in nonproliferation
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) verification lacks effective technical approaches
- Shift to global focus and enhanced Corporate Threat Reduction and collaboration will provide important access and transparency
- Further analysis is needed to understand role and value of information protection versus transparency and its impacts on all aspects of biological threat reduction as well as to understand the requirements and possibilities for biological weapons treaty compliance and verification
The IAS expects a number of initiatives for new programs to result from this conference.
For more information, contact: Helen Cui, hhcui@lanl.gov
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